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During the last decade, developing (and some developed) economies have accumulated large 
amounts of international reserves, mainly for precautionary reasons. This phenomenon has 
been coupled with moderate economic growth. The resources being amassed largely 
overwhelm protective needs, there is an excess of resources that is being wasted, and which 
could be utilised for alternative productive projects, namely to promote growth. If insufficient 
aggregate demand can largely explain low growth, it is clear that this excess of international 
reserves can be used to stimulate aggregate demand. This paper argues that the excess of 
international reserves represents a potential source to boost growth.     
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For many economies rapid and stable long run growth has remained elusive. 
This includes many developing countries which, since the beginning of the 1980s, 
have recorded paltry growth, including Latin American and sub-Saharan African 
countries (see UNCTAD, 2003). There are, however, also developed economies that 
have recently grown at poor rates; the most remarkable being the Japanese economy.  
Some of these economies have, since the mid 1990s, but particularly since the 
end of the South East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, amassed large amounts of 
international reserves. Latin America, for example, by 2005 had accumulated 63.4 per 
cent more international reserves than it had in 1996, when the Mexican peso crisis 
concluded. Sub-Saharan Africa accumulated an astonishing 290 per cent during the 
same period; which is almost the same amount that Japan accumulated, 284 per cent, 
over the same time.   
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  1The reasons for the large hoardings of foreign currency, particularly for 
developing economies, are mainly underpinned by the so-called precautionary, 
mercantilist and policy autonomy motives (see Aizenman, 2007, 2006, Aizenman and 
Lee, 2007, and Bird and Mandarilas, 2005). There is, nevertheless, no guarantee that 
these aims can be achieved and accumulating reserves for their own sake generates 
direct and potential detrimental costs both for the domestic and for the global 
economy (see Cruz and Walters, 2008, García and Soto, 2004, Mohanthy and Turner, 
2006, Schiller, 2007, Wheatley, 2007).  
Moreover, there is no theoretical justification for the large quantities of foreign 
resources being amassed. Independently of whether rules of thumb (i.e. the ratio of 
imports to international reserves or the Guidotti-Greenspan rule) or econometric 
models are used to measure the optimal level of international reserves, the results 
show that there is always an excess of international reserves, in some cases a very 
large one (see Floerkemeier and Sumslinski, 2008, Jeanne, 2007 and Jeanne and 
Rancière, 2006). This excess of resources is being wasted, and could be utilised for 
alternative purposes, in particular for growth goals. In this sense, there has been little 
discussion of the fact that these resources can be used to pursue growth in those 
economies that share the dual characteristic of growing moderately or need to recover 
their level of growth after having suffered a crisis, coupled with excess foreign 
international reserves.  
Importantly, insufficient growth in capitalist economies can be largely 
ascribed to ineffective aggregate demand
1 (Kalecki, 1933; Keynes, 1936). Thus, 
clearly, the excess of international reserves can be used to stimulate aggregate demand 
through any or some of its components. Developing economies lack sufficient 
productive capacity, so here demand can be boosted through further levels of 
  2investment. In fact, “... in the interplay of linkages that make up a virtuous growth 
regime, capital accumulation holds a central place” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 61); 
moreover, in these economies, the expansion of physical capacity provides the basis 
for long term growth. Developed economies, on the other hand, might just need to 
boost consumption as they do not have shortages of productive capacity and thus, in 
this case, increasing levels of capital accumulation might have little effects on short 
term aggregate demand and may tend to constrain long term growth. 
In addition, the international implications of countries building up excess 
international reserves also need to be noted. Reserves accumulate as a result of 
intentional policy decisions. In particular, the build up of reserves is associated with 
lower rates of growth of output, but also of imports. This means that one country 
increasing its reserves will reduce effective demand elsewhere. As a result, a general 
build up of reserves of the kind noted will be associated with lower levels of global 
demand and, therefore, lower levels of world economic activity. So, the build up of 
reserves is associated with lower levels of both domestic and international demand. 
The aim of this paper is to argue that excess international reserves represents a 
potential source to boost growth in those economies that, as we have stressed, have 
recorded moderate economic performance since they started to horde large amounts of 
foreign exchange.  
The next section provides an overview of what drives international reserve 
accumulation, and the fact that there has been little attention to the use of the excess 
of these resources for growth purposes. In section 3, we provide evidence that 
economies have accumulated reserves beyond their needs. To this end we measure the 
excess of international reserves using the notion of the maximum sustainable external 
threshold proposed by Cruz and Walters (2007). Section 4 shows the way 
  3international reserves, aggregate demand and growth can be related and illustrates, by 
calculating the upper bound rate of growth for a sample of economies, that excess 
international reserves can stimulate growth.  
 
2. International reserves: accumulation motives and beyond  
  The tendency to accumulate large amounts of international reserves, 
particularly in the developing countries, started in the aftermath of the Mexican peso 
crisis of 1994-1995. However, it was only with The 2001 Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Financing for Development to the United Nations, the so-called Zedillo 
Report, which pointed out that since the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 international 
reserves in emerging economies had increased by around 60 per cent, that this 
phenomenon came under the scrutiny of the academic community. The increase in 
international reserves after other financial crises in the developing world ocurred, 
notably in Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1998-1999, Turkey in 2001 and Argentina in 
2001-2002, was confirmed by more recent studies. For instance, Rodrik (2006, p. 255) 
points out that emerging countries’ international reserves “have risen from 6-8 per 
cent of GDP during the 1970s and 1980s to almost 30 percent of GDP by 2004”. 
Currently, around two thirds of international reserves are held by developing countries 
(Aizenman, 2007). The phenomenon of foreign reserves accumulation, as can be seen, 
is strongly associated with financial crises over the developing world.  
In the light of the unprecedented levels of international reserves that 
economies are accumulating, two facts are worth noting. In the first place, it is worth 
considering the motives that are driving the accumulation of reserves, namely the 
precautionary, mercantilist and policy autonomy motives, as well as the arguments 
against them. In effect, as financial crises and its high associated output costs caused 
  4growing accumulation of international reserves, it is clear that the primary reason for 
the building up of international reserves has been, as Bird and Mandarilas (2005) 
point out, to reduce the risks of future financial crises, providing financial stability 
through the increase of liquidity, or, what has be known in the literature as the 
precautionary motive. However, a buffer stock of reserves, even a large one, might 
not deter the negative cycle of speculative-attacks-financial-crisis if the economy 
adopts or reinforces rapid financial liberalisation. In this sense, UNCTAD (2003, p. 
36) points out that “the history of international capital flows in periods of minimum 
government intervention and control suggests that financial markets do have a 
tendency to produce boom-bust cycles in individual economies, with periodic defaults 
as the natural outcome”. In short, by deregulating the capital account, no matter how 
high its degree of liquidity, the economy remains highly exposed to the punishing 
vicissitudes of hot money (see Cruz and Walters, 2008).  
In this vein, it is worthy noting that until very recently, and only after the huge 
output losses caused by financial crises, fervent advocators of the strategy of financial 
liberalisation have clearly signalled the perils associated with this strategy. Some have 
recognised, for instance, that “there is plenty of evidence that premature opening of 
the capital account… can hurt a country by making the structure of inflows 
unfavourable and by making the country vulnerable to sudden stops or reversal of 
flows” (Kose et al, 2006, pp. 34-5). Others, more optimistically but ironically, have 
argued that despite currency crises, financial liberalisation can be linked to boom-bust 
cycles (see Tornell et al, 2004). Finally, others have warned that abandoning financial 
repression may lead to an explosion of government debt and lower economic growth 
(Fry, 1997, p. 768).
2 
  5Another motive is that trying to emulate the export-led growth success of some 
economies (namely the first-tier of Asian tigers and China), increased reserves have 
been seen as a by-product of maintaining a competitive exchange rate designed to 
expand tradable production. In this sense the accumulation of international reserves is 
considered an active industrial policy, or, what has to be known in the literature as a 
the mercantilist motive (see Aizenman and Lee, 2007). In this case, the empirical 
evidence contests this approach and it has been argued that that the management of 
international reserves should not be seen as a panacea, particularly for either an 
export-led growth strategy. (Aizenman, 2006) or as a replacement for an industry 
policy. In particular, rather than having a lower exchange rate associated with a build 
up of foreign reserves, the same exchange rate could also be associated with higher 
growth rates, which would not only improve output and employment but would also 
encourage further investment, often a major problem in developing economies.  
Finally, countries have engaged on accumulating reserves as a way of attaining 
policy autonomy in the sense of “… minimising the need to turn to the IMF if crises 
occurred” (Bird and Mandarilas, 2005, p. 85). As the empirical evidence has shown, 
however, financial liberalisation has preceded financial crises and their associated 
huge costs and it has reduced significantly the space for and the autonomy to 
formulate policies in the pursuit of national development objectives. So, the sort of 
policy autonomy attained by accumulating international reserves is very narrow and is 
not conductive to growth and/or industrialisation goals. 
It is also important to highlight costs associated with the accumulation of 
international reserves.  As well as direct costs, holding reserves incurs an opportunity 
cost, which is the difference between what the reserves could have earned and what 
they actually earn; Rodrik (2000, 2006) and Bird & Rajan (2003), among others, have 
  6estimated that the excess of reserves holdings to be around 1 per cent of GDP. There 
are also potential costs because, “large reserves stocks may create moral hazard 
problems that could weaken the financial system of a country. This, in turn, could 
make crises to be deeper…” (García and Soto, 2004, pp. 17-18; see also Schiller, 
2007). Moreover, large and prolonged reserve accumulation aimed at resisting or 
delaying currency appreciation can create a range of domestic macroeconomic risks, 
which may include near term inflation, high intervention costs and monetary 
imbalances (see, Mohanty and Turner, 2006, Wheatley, 2007). In addition, the 
opportunity costs must include the other options available to the economy if, instead 
of accumulating reserves, the economy used the resources in stimulating growth. The 
higher levels of growth, both in output and employment would induce additional 
investment. This in turn, by expanding domestic capacity, would alleviate future 
currency problems and increase the economy’s autonomy. 
Under these circumstances, current large holdings of reserves seem unrelated 
to any clear notion of what might constitute an optimal level. This is unsurprising as 
there no uniform consensus (neither empirical nor theoretical) about what might 
constitute the optimal level of international reserves. Therefore, the accumulation of 
international reserves can best be characterised as following what has come to be 
called Mrs. Machlup´s wardrobe theory. According to Bird and Rajan (2003, p. 877), 
this theory suggests that the “acquisitive characteristics of monetary authorities in 
terms of adding to their reserves resembled those of Mr. Machlup’s wife in terms of 
clothes. According to this idea no level of reserves was ever enough.” 
The second relevant fact accompanying the remarkable accumulation of 
international reserves, which is often ignored in the literature, is the moderate growth 
performance of both crisis-affected and non-affected economies. This is especially the 
  7case for Latin American nations, where a number of economies underwent financial 
collapses. Other crisis-affected regions, such as East Asia, witnessed a lower level of 
economic growth in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 crisis, when compared to their 
growth performance achieved prior to this crisis.  
Importantly, despite the fact that some affected economies have grown at high 
rates after their crisis (remarkably Argentina, Turkey and Russia) and others have 
recaptured quickly their growth path (for instance Korea) none of them have 
recovered yet (and they are unlikely to do so) from the large negative shocks suffered. 
This is because crisis-affected economies not only suffer a large and persistent 
negative output loss, but it has been shown that they never recover from such large 
negative shocks in the sense that output losses are not reversed. Evidence of this fact 
has been recently formalised and presented by Cerra and Sexena (2008). In their 
work, the authors estimate that the lost of output due to a currency crisis varies 
between 1 and 5 per cent, and output loss persists even at a ten-year horizon. In the 
case of a banking crisis, the output impact is, on average, 7.5 per cent and is as 
persistent as for a currency crisis. Finally, in the case of a twin crisis, the authors find 
that the output loss is deeper than either of the individual crises and that by the third 
year after the crisis, output loss reaches and remains at 10 per cent. 
Other countries and regions, both developed and developing (like Japan and 
Sub-Saharan Africa), that did not undergo a financial crisis but that followed the 
fashion of accumulating extraordinary amounts of foreign exchange have also 
recorded moderate levels of economic growth (see table 1). 
Here Table 1 
 
Summarising, on the one hand, large amounts of international reserves do not 
guarantee the prevention of future speculative attacks, the ensuing financial crisis or 
  8the associated output costs
3 nor do they allow support for an active long term 
industrial policy to boost exports and provide space for growth/industrialisation policy 
goals. On the other hand, and more importantly, these large amounts of unused 
resources have been associated with moderate economic growth, especially in cases 
when the country is most in the need of it (that is after a crisis). This leads to the 
question of whether these resources (specifically its excess) would not been more 
beneficially utilised to accelerate growth, for instance by financing infrastructure. In 
this sense, particularly for developing economies, “the key question is whether higher 
returns, after allowance for risk, could be made elsewhere (eg through investment in 
the country’s domestic infrastructure)” (Bank of England, available online, p. 10). 
This proposal, though debatable,
4 represents an important alternative to 
promote economic growth, as there is no theoretical or technical impediment that 
stops policymakers from implementing it. Moreover, the stimulation of economic 
growth (and employment generation) should be a priority after the economy has 
suffered a deep economic slowdown as a result of a crisis, so that the need for rapid 
and sustained growth is more urgent than ever. This is particularly relevant when the 
economy is in the earlier stages of industrialisation and requires large amounts of 
resources (particularly foreign exchange to acquire, for instance, capital equipment) to 
enhance, accelerate and sustain this process. For these economies in particular, these 
idle resources represent forgone development projects. These resources in fact, when 
wisely allocated (namely expanding productive capacity in strategic sectors, industries 
with high growth potential or financing R&D to raise productivity) could also 
represent the basis for long term growth.  
Furthermore, even though there is no evidence that international reserves have 
been used to promote growth through financing infrastructure projects, especially 
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evidence that countries with good growth records and large amounts of foreign 
exchange (mainly the result of large current account surpluses) have not left these 
resources unproductively. China, within the group of emerging economies, is 
maximizing returns through investing the resources in investment funds, particularly 
through sovereignty wealth funds (see Singh, 2006, and Truman, 2007). This is also a 
common practice for recently industrialized economies (like Korea and Singapore) 
and rich-oil Middle-East economies such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and 
Qatar. Within the group of developed economies, Norway is a good example of how 
to use international reserves productively. 
By proposing the use of international reserves to boost growth, we are not 
suggesting the running down of all reserves, leaving the economy illiquid and 
therefore highly exposed to domestic and/or external shocks. Clearly there are 
precautionary reasons for holding reserves. Our proposal consists of using excess 
international reserves, that is, the amount that is not necessary to protect the economy 
from the total or overall vulnerability of the balance-of-payments, arising from both 
the capital and the current accounts. Obviously, the key point is the establishing of the 
criterion used to define an adequate (rather than optimal) level of international 
reserves, and how to gauge if it is excess. That is “quantifying optimum [adequate] 
reserves is… not straightforward since it is difficult to estimate the adjustment costs 
and output losses that reserves may enable a country to avoid” (Bird and Mandilaras, 
2005, p. 86).  
 
  103. Calculating the excess of international reserves 
Historically, two rule of thumbs (from the 1960s, the ratio of international 
reserves to imports, and more recently the Guiotti-Greespan rule) have been generally 
used as guides to establish the adequate level of international reserves and define its 
excess.    
  Before the recent escalation of financial crises, the vulnerability of the 
balance-of-payments stemmed almost exclusively from the current account. For this 
reason, the logic determining the adequate level of international reserves was based on 
the value of imports. For operational reasons, the ratio of international reserves to 
imports (R/M) became the standard measure defining reserve adequacy, with the ratio 
indicating the number of months of imports that could be financed from the reserves. 
This criterion increased in importance as the economy became more open and its 
vulnerability to domestic or external shocks increased accordingly. An adequate level 
of reserves was conventionally established as that level of reserves which was able to 
cover at least three or four months of imports. It is important to notice that this 
criterion lacked any theoretical underpinning; it was a rule of thumb, based on a 
conventional, discretionary view of what was considered adequate (see Bird and 
Rajan, 2003). 
A crucial difference in the new era is that the vulnerability of the balance-of-
payments now emanates primarily from the capital rather than the current account. 
Thus “developing country’s reserves is related to changes not in real quantities (such 
as imports or output) but in financial magnitudes” (Rodrik, 2006, p. 257, emphasis in 
the original). To determine, therefore, reserve adequacy requires consideration of the 
need to protect the total vulnerability of the balance-of-payments. This is the essence 
of the Guidotti-Greenspan rule,
5 which suggests “the maintenance of reserves 
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not limited to imports” (Mendoza, 2004, p. 76). This, like the R/M ratio, is a 
conventional criterion, a rule of thumb, about what is considered adequate.  
More recently, Cruz and Walters (2007) proposed a more ad hoc criterion, 
dubbed the maximum sustainable external threshold, to measure the adequate level of 
international reserves. This measure also takes into consideration the overall 
vulnerability of the balance-of-payments, maintaining the operationality of the R/M 
and Greenspan-Guidotti ratios, but it gauges international reserve adequacy in terms 
of GDP.  
The central idea of this threshold comes from the fact that during recent 
financial crises, both the current account deficit and the short term external debt, both 
expressed as a fraction of GDP, reached levels beyond which the historical record 
indicates financial markets start to get nervous and, on that basis, decide to withdraw 
their capital out of the country. Thus, the ratio is grounded in evidence which reflects 
market perceptions of emerging economies’ financial stability. For instance, the 
current account deficit to GDP ratio beyond which international financial markets 
start to get nervous for understandable reasons, historically, seems to be of the order 
of 2-3 per cent (depending on circumstances) (see Thirlwall, 2003). Unfortunately, the 
same cannot be deduced in the case of the capital account, as during the recent series 
of crises, there was no real concern by domestic authorities about what level of short-
term external debt to GDP ratios would be adequate to reassure investors. As a result, 
there is no strong historical record which would identify, at least roughly, the range 
below which the short-term external debt to GDP ratio must remain in order to keep 
international financial markets calm.  
  12Looking at the evolution of the short term external debt to GDP ratio for a 
sample of crises-affected economies, Cruz and Walters (2007) infer that, in general, 
there is a declining trend, reaching the single digit level in 2002 for all countries in the 
sample, except Indonesia, and, in fact, at low levels (less than 5 per cent) for some 
economies like Mexico and Brazil. Based on this evidence, the authors suggest that 
the short-term external debt to GDP ratio that is consistent with calm in the 
international markets is likely to be within a range similar to the one of current 
account deficit to GDP, that is of 2-3 per cent. 
The authors, therefore, suggest that a level of reserves that could maintain 
financial investors’ confidence could be of the order of around 5-6 per cent of GDP. 
Any level of international reserves above that threshold can be considered to be 
excessive. The threshold might well vary, depending on the particular circumstances 
of individual economies and on the prevailing domestic and external conditions.  
It is important to stress that “while it is easy to say that the adequacy of 
reserves depends on investors’ confidence, it is difficult to say with precision what 
determines this…, it will almost certainly be influenced by the package of economic 
policies that a government is pursuing and the commitment with which they are being 
pursued, as well as by economic performance, but it is likely to be affected by the 
perceived degree of financial stability and indeed by the level of reserves as well” 
(Bird and Rajan, 2003, pp. 879-80). In this sense, due to the impossibility of defining 
what determines investors’ confidence and their behaviour, it is important to bear in 
mind that the threshold proposed is, like the R/M ratio and the Guidotti-Greenspan 
rule, an ad hoc and atheoretical criterion and ultimately a rule of thumb. Nonetheless, 
we prefer to adopt this ad hoc criterion to measure the excess of international reserves 
  13as it explicitly takes into account the factors that triggered the recent financial crises, 
namely investors’ confidence. 
Using this criterion we can now attempt to measure the excess of international 
reserves. Table 2 shows the evolution of international reserves and excess reserves for 
our sample of selected economies, assuming a maximum sustainable external 
threshold of 6 per cent. In the case of crises-affected economies, we estimated the 
excess from the year immediately following the year in which their respective crisis 
began, until 2005. This is because, as we noted earlier, they started to accumulate 
massive reserves in the aftermath of their crises (for example, for Mexico, the excess 
is calculated for the period 1996-2005, in the case of Brazil for 2000-05, and so on), 
whereas for non-affected countries or regions, like Japan and Sub-Saharan Africa, we 
calculate excess reserves for the whole period 1996-2005.  
The first important point to emerge from table 2 is that all economies, even 
before they were hit by a crisis, show a growing tendency to accumulate international 
reserves. In particular, East Asian economies register large amounts of international 
reserves during the whole period 1996-2005. From this group, Malaysia and Thailand 
demonstrate very high levels of reserves. This is, to a certain extent, unsurprising as 
these economies record constant and large trade surpluses.  
Secondly, table 2 reveals that each economy in the sample has an excess of 
international reserves. This excess varies from a low level of 1.7 per cent for Brazil 
and Mexico to a high of 36.6 per cent of GDP for Malaysia. These results are 
consistent with those reported by Jeanne (2007) and Jeanne and Rancière (2006) in 
the sense that Asian economies have the largest excesses of international reserves. 
These numbers, importantly, are not by any mean insignificant. They represent much 
higher levels than the budget allocated for crucial matters such as education, R&D or 
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indicates that the levels of international reserves have been beyond those needed to 
protect the economy from the overall instability of the balance-of-payments. This 
suggests that there has been a large level of unutilised resources which could have 
been used to improve the growth record of each of these countries. 
In addition, given the importance of high levels of effective demand for 
investment and for the maintenance of animal spirits, it is clear that policymakers 
should use all the tools at their disposal to achieve increasing and sustaining growth. 
Ironically, the room to manoeuvre for traditional tools, such as monetary and fiscal 
policy, to stimulate aggregate demand, has been drastically reduced, in tandem with 
the imposition (or adoption) of the neoliberal agenda, which compels, among others, 
fiscal budget balance (if not surplus) and inflation targets of no more than three per 
cent per annum as a pre-requisite for growth (see Chang, 2007). This has led to severe 
restrictions on aggregate demand through lower public spending and tight monetary 
conditions, which discourage investment through low levels of economic activity and 
high rates of interest.  
An alternative, which promotes escape from this policy straightjacket, as we 
have emphasised, is the utilization of the excess foreign exchange resources being 
amassed. This excess can be used to expand aggregate demand. In the next section we 
aim to address a theoretical explanation of how the excess foreign exchange can be 
used to accelerate growth (and generate employment). 
Here Table 2 
 
4. Aggregate demand and growth  
“The problem of unemployment in underdeveloped countries differs 
fundamentally from that in developed economies. In the latter, 
unemployment arises on account of inadequacy of effective demand. 
  15During periods of depression unemployed labour coexists with 
underutilised equipment. The situation may, therefore, be tackled by 
measures designed to stimulate effective demand, such as loan 
financed government expenditure. 
Unemployment and underemployment in underdeveloped countries 
are of an entirely different nature. They result from the shortage of 
capital equipment rather than from deficiency of effective demand”. 
(Kalecki, 1960 p. 3) 
“The crucial problem of the underdeveloped economies is different 
from that of the developed countries. This is not to deny that in an 
underdeveloped economy there may be a deficiency of effective 
demand. There are many instances of countries whose capital 
equipment, meager though it is, will nevertheless be underutilised. 
However, as contrasted with developed economies, even if this 
equipment is fully utilised, it is still not capable of absorbing all 
available labour, as a result of which the standard of living is very 
low.... the main problem here being the deficiency of productive 
capacity rather than the anomaly of its underutilization..... The 
crucial problem facing the underdeveloped countries is thus to 
increase investment considerably, not for the sake of generating 
effective demand, as was the case in an underemployed developed 
economy, but for the sake of accelerating the expansion of 
productive capacity indispensable for the rapid growth of the 
national income”. (Kalecki, 1966 pp. 15-16) 
 
As these passages from Kalecki indicate, the fundamental factor constraining 
growth in developed economies is the level of effective demand, while for developing 
economies, though effective demand may be important, the main constraint comes 
from the lack of productive capacity. For both of these types of economy, the build up 
of excess foreign reserves represents lost opportunities in terms of reduced growth 
and employment.  
Low levels of aggregate demand will lead to a build up of inventories, causing 
a slow down in production and investment, which will further reduce employment and 
consumption. It will also translate into declining profits, leading to an increased 
inability of firms to service and discharge outstanding debts and, importantly, in the 
generation of negative expectations that this cycle, ceteris paribus, will perpetuate 
itself, inhibiting future investments and thus reducing income expansion.  
  16In this context, the recommended policy is clear: the path of sustained growth 
(and growing employment) can be regained by stimulating one or more components 
of aggregate demand. More precisely, “in the Keynes/Kalecki approach… policies to 
maintain appropriate levels of aggregate demand are essential to bring about high 
profits and keep firms financially healthy” (López and Carvalho, 2008, p. 5). Needless 
to say, more vigorous policies are needed when the economy has suffered an 
economic collapse or is in recession.
6 
Knowing that insufficient aggregate demand is the main cause of low growth 
does not imply that all countries should stimulate the same components of aggregate 
demand or that demand should be increased for its own sake. In this sense, the 
decision regarding which component of aggregate demand should be stimulated will 
depend, among other factors, on whether the economy is developed or semi-
developed. In other words, the decision of where aggregate demand needs to be 
boosted has to be taken on the basis of the particular structural characteristics of the 
economy under consideration and what will contribute most to growth in the short 
term without restricting it in the long one.
7  
The fundamental problem in developed economies is rooted in inadequate 
levels of aggregate domestic demand. The existence of idle productive capacity 
implies that there is no need for additional capital accumulation which may, in fact, 
constrain long term growth. For capitalism investment is a double edged sword. In the 
short run it increases effective demand, which is important in reducing today’s 
unemployment, but, at the same time it increases capacity and productivity, which 
increase tomorrow’s unemployment. Thus, for developed economies the policy 
recommendation to boost growth and increase the degree of capacity utilization 
  17(reducing unemployment) will emphasis consumption. Investment becomes important 
mainly when considering international competitiveness.  
On the other hand, as the quote from Kalecki indicates, the problem of low 
growth (and unemployment) in developing economies is of a different nature as for 
these economies it results mainly from a shortage of capital equipment.
8 In this case, 
therefore, stimulating effective demand through the expansion of capacity 
productivity through higher investment will be essential for both short and long term 
growth. In developing economies, the effect of investment is unambiguously positive 
in its ability to increase capacity, and by increasing the size of the capital stock, 
enable increased employment and growth. It important to notice that since, in these 
economies, most capital goods are imported, with limited domestic capital goods 
producing industries, the balance of trade provides an important constraint on the 
economy’s ability to grow. The build up of international reserves reduces the growth 
potential of developing economies. If, instead the economies were able to expand at a 
higher growth rate, they would be able to use the resources which were generating 
reserves to finance the import of investment goods to aid industrialisation. In this 
case, the economy would be less reliant on imports in future growth episodes, as its 
ability to provide for domestic activity would be higher.
9 
Investment plays a vital role in the growth process as it “… simultaneously 
generates income and expands productive capacity, and it also carries strong 
complementarities with other elements in the growth process, such as technological 
progress, skills acquisitions and institutional deepening” (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 61). In 
fact, as that study stresses, “among the many variables fed into growth equations, 
investment still emerges as one of the few with a robust and independent impact on 
growth, particularly for rapidly growing middle-income economies” (Ibid; see also 
  18Kenny and Williams, 2001, p. 8). The evidence of the most recent industrialized 
economies (the first and second tier of Asian Tigers and China) confirms that for 
rapid and sustained growth, capital accumulation was a sine qua non condition (see 
Young, 1994, 1995, Krugman, 1994, Bosworth and Collins 2003, 2007
10). In other 
words, capital accumulation is fundamental for the take-off of any developing 
economy.
11 So, if a developing economy really aims at accelerating and maintaining 
growth, sustaining and growing levels of capital accumulation are necessary 
conditions. This is reinforced by the empirical evidence demonstrating a strong link 
between growth and investment, especially when is in the form of machinery and 
equipment (see Madsen, 2002). According to UNCTAD (2003, p. vi), “the minimum 
level needed for a satisfactory growth performance will be influenced by country-
specific factors, but a 20 per cent share of fixed investment in GDP has been 
suggested as a target threshold in poor countries, rising towards 25 per cent as 
countries climb the income ladder”.  
For capitalist economies, it is worth noting that a recovery of aggregate 
demand must originate in those of its components which are autonomous with respect 
to current income. In the case of private domestic expenditure, for instance, it is 
unlikely that capitalists, let alone workers, will increase consumption when their 
current incomes are contracting. This might not be the case, however, where income 
is stagnating or growing slowly rather than falling.
12 Private investment, on the other 
hand, will also be unlikely to increase if firms have unused capacity, and are facing 
problems paying off or servicing their debts. In these circumstances, any stimulus to 
aggregate demand must originate from outside the private sector, for example by 
increased public spending, either consumption and investment, or through tax cuts. 
(López and Carvalho, 2008, pp. 6-7). Monetary policy, in the form of reduced interest 
  19rates, is unlikely to provide any effective stimulus to demand, as neither consumption 
nor investment are likely to be interest elastic during a contractionary period (Kriesler 
and Nevile, 2003). 
“Now, in the case of developing countries, public spending should consist 
mostly of public investment, since the infrastructure provided by the state is 
fundamental in the process of economic growth” (López and Carvalho, 2008, p. 9). 
There is, indeed, a large literature that shows that public investment is beneficial for 
short and long term growth and that it complements, rather than crowds-out, private 
investment (see, for example, Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1992; Otto and Voss, 1994; 
Nazmi and Ramírez, 1997; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Erden and Halcombe, 
2006; Bose et al, 2007; Herrera, 2007; Noriega and Fontanela, 2007). The take-off, in 
other words, must be made through public investment. 
Of course, investment should be made according to a coherent and a well 
designed strategy of industrialisation, meaning aiming “… at particular industries 
(and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the 
state to be efficient for the economy as a whole” (Chang, 2003, p. 112, emphasis in 
the original). This means that there is a case for the state to “selectively monitoring 
entry, establishing mechanisms to make possible more ex ante coordination than is 
possible through market mechanisms alone, and for governmental regulation or 
overview to constrain or supplement profit incentives” (Nelson, 1981, quoted by 
Chang 2003, p. 113). Otherwise, as Robinson, clearly put it (1976, p. 9): “To embark 
upon large schemes of investment without coherent plan will mean a great of wasted 
effort”.
13  
It is also important to emphasise that promoting investment is likely to reduce 
inflationary pressure when there are shortages of capital equipment. In fact, sources of 
  20inflation (like increases in the prices of food-stuff due to higher demand) can be 
controlled by the application of the appropriate policies. Moreover, growing economic 
activity implies higher tax revenues and lower transfers and so is likely to reduce any 
existing fiscal deficits, while the increased tax revenues can be used to continue 
financing economic expansion. In other words, rapid growth promoted by 
expansionary policies does not need to be coupled with fiscal deficits nor generate 
high inflation. 
A final remark. Surpluses in the current account are a method of exporting one 
country’s unemployment and insufficient aggregate demand problems (Halevi and 
Kriesler, 1998). If countries maintain such surpluses, the increased domestic 
employment from the trade surplus, will be offset in another country whose balance of 
trade is in deficit, and which will need to lower domestic growth rates to improve 
their trade balance. Deficit countries experience leakages to domestic demand, as one 
country’s imports are another’s exports. Excess international reserves represents a loss 
to all countries. By lowering the growth rates of countries, it also lowers their imports. 
This, in turn, lowers demand levels in these countries, with the concomitant lower 
rates of growth. As was discussed above, the main determinant of a country’s level of 
exports is the level of world activity. Higher reserves reduce that level of activity, and 
hence reduce exports. In other words, the tendency for developing economies to build 
up excess foreign reserves will lead to a reduction in total international trade, and, 
therefore lower levels of world economic activity. The effects spread beyond the 
countries building up these excess reserves, due to their lower levels of economic 
activity and the resulting lower level of imports. In other words, the excess build up of 
international reserves reinforces stagnationist tendencies that result from the current 
international monetary system (Halevi and Kriesler, 2007). 
  21In sum, to accelerate growth, aggregate demand needs to be stimulated 
through any its components. Excess international reserves can act as resources to help 
promote this end. In the case of developed economies the option is to promote public 
and/or private consumption, whereas for the developing economies the most viable 
and convenient choice, specially for long term purposes, is by way of public 
investment, though private investment and public or private consumption represent 
alternatives (especially when there is large idle productive capacity). In both cases, 
importantly, it is the government that needs to take the main role in ensuring the 
necessary measures.   
 
4.1 Stimulating growth through the excess of international reserves: a simple exercise  
In tables 3 to 5, we present the evolution of the components of aggregate 
demand for the same group of selected economies presented in table 1. As can be 
seen, since these economies started to accumulate international reserves, the evolution 
of the components of aggregate demand shows, in general, a stagnated or declining 
trend. In fact, as expected, in most of the crisis-affected economies, levels of 
aggregate demand have not recovered to the levels they were at prior to their crises. In 
particular, the figures in table 3 clearly indicate that the investment to income 
thresholds recommended by UNCTAD (2003) have not been achieved. Indeed, some 
regions (like Sub-Saharan Africa) and some economies (like Argentina, Mexico, 
Brazil and Russia) are still far from these levels, whereas other countries (like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Turkey) despite having achieved or overcome 
such thresholds in the past, experienced drastically decreased investment after their 
respective crisis. This evidence shows that the economic performance of the 
  22economies in the sample have experienced a vicious and reinforcing cycle of 
stagnated aggregate demand and moderate economic growth.  
Tables 3 to 5 
 
Tables 3 to 5 also confirm that there is plenty of room to stimulate aggregate 
demand in all these economies. The excess of international reserves can be used to 
achieve this goal. To illustrate this, we elaborate a simple exercise to calculate the 
upper bound rate of growth of some developing economies in our sample, assuming 
that excess foreign exchange would have been used to stimulate aggregate demand 
through investment.
14 
  To do this we apply two basic steps. First, we follow the policy prescriptions 
derived from the Keynes/Kalecki approach discussed earlier. Accordingly, we assume 
that some the developing economies shown in table 2 (specifically, Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Russia) used their 
respective excess resources to increase their productive capacity. Furthermore, they 
increased investment levels, particularly through public investment, with a coherent 
strategy of industrialisation.  
The second step consists of estimating the capital-output ratio to know by how 
much these previously unused resources would have contributed to the observed rate 
of growth. Table 6 shows the estimated capital-output ratio for some economies. We 
obtained this value by dividing the average rate of growth of gross capital formation 
five years before each country’s respective crisis occurred by the average GDP’s rate 
growth during the same period. With this information and the excess of international 
reserves shown in table 2 we calculate the upper bound rate of growth. The last 
column in table 6 presents the results. 
  23As can be seen, had all developing countries in the sample used their excess 
international reserves to boost investment they would have achieved a considerably 
higher rate of growth than the one observed after their respective crises. In fact, 
except for the Latin American economies, the rest would have practically doubled 
their observed growth rates.    
 
Table 6 here 
 
On the other hand, high income economies, like Japan and Korea, could also 
use their excess international reserves to stimulate aggregate demand and growth. In 
this case, the Keynes/Kalecki prescription consists of increasing public and/or private 
consumption. In this case, however, to calculate the upper bound of the growth rate is 
not so straightforward. To illustrate, nonetheless, our point we refer to a recent article 
by Chandler (2008). In this work, the author suggests that the Japanese economy can 
be stimulated through boosting consumption. To achieve this goal, he proposes that if 
a quarter (roughly US$242 billion) of the total amount of Japan’s current international 
reserves were given back to its citizens (knowing that the propensity to consume after 
taxes of Japanese people is around 73 per cent) the result will be that they will end up 
consuming at least US$1300 each, which is the equivalent of around 2.5 per cent of 
Japan’s GDP. This, undoubtedly, will set in motion the virtuous cycle of income 
expansion-aggregate demand-investment- economic growth.  
In addition, if the economies discussed above were to expand by using their 
excess international reserves, then this would have flow effects on the level of world 
economic activity. The major expansions envisaged, would stimulate the trading 
partners of these economies, which would, in turn, further stimulates world economic 
activity. In other words, by running down excess reserves, not only would growth 
  24rates increase due to the resultant increase in domestic activity, but they would be 
further boosted by the resulting increase in global economic activity. 
These results give strong evidence to support the argument that if 
policymakers want to accelerate growth, then excess international reserves are a 
potential tool at their disposal. Low economic performance, in other words, 
(borrowing Chandler’s, 2008, title), means the rainy days that excess international 
reserves are theoretically meant for. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The accumulation of international reserves, particularly in the developing 
world, has sharply increased since the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. These 
resources have been effectively taken out of circulation, and have not been used to 
influence domestic economic activity. As a result, they represent a potential source of 
economic growth, which could stimulate domestic economic activity in these 
economies. The effects of these would be to stimulate aggregate demand, particularly 
through investment in the case of developing economies and therefore increase 
domestic capacity levels. At the same time, the increased levels of domestic activity 
would spill over into increased global activity and trade, which would further benefit 
these economies. This demonstrates that these reserves have a large opportunity cost 






  25Endnotes 
1 Globalisation has increased this tendency – see Kriesler and Nevile (2003). 
2 For a pertinent explanation of why financial liberalisation did not boost investment 
and growth in emerging economies but rather led to increased volatility and crises 
see Rodrik and Subramanian (2008). 
3 This is true even for developed countries, where the economy is performing well 
according to the factors that financial markets supposedly give weight to (see 
Kriesler and Nevile 2003). 
4 Rodrik (2006, p. 8) for example argues that “the process of accumulating 
international reserves… makes clear that the relevant counterfactual in most 
instances is not one dollar of additional public investment, but one less dollar of 
short-term foreign debt.” Truman (2007), on the other hand, highlights that using 
international reserves for development purposes might be problematic as this might 
require both the recalibrating and reversal of economic and financial policies. 
5 Proposed initially by Pablo Guidotti (then deputy finance minister of Argentina) and 
then refined by former U.S Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in 1999. 
6 The Economist’s (2007) analysis of Chinese growth further illustrates the relevance 
of aggregate demand to economic growth considering that“... the popular notion that 
China is dependent on export-led growth is a myth; domestic demand is much more 
important. This year the increase in China's net exports (ie, less imports) is likely to 
account for about one quarter of its growth—a record amount. But even without this 
external boost, GDP growth would still have been a respectable 9%”. 
7 In the analysis that follows we omit exports as this variable of aggregate demand 
does not depend, to a large extend on domestic policymakers, particularly in the 
short run. 
  268 However, there might be cases, as Kalecki (1976, p. 23) stresses, in which capital 
equipment “… meagre though it is, will nevertheless be underutilised”, so 
stimulating private and public consumption may also be important in these 
economies. 
9 In the same vein, one of the most important reasons for developed economies not 
expanding demand, in cases where there is excess capacity and/or unemployed 
labour, is the constraint imposed by the balance of trade. Here, the problem is that 
increased levels of economic activity are associated with increased imports. Unless 
this is matched by increased exports, the long run prognosis is for deficits in the 
current account and depreciating currency. –Since the main determinant of exports 
is usually the level of world economic activity, which is exogenous to the country, 
this implies an important constraint to economic growth. Excess reserves can be 
used to finance any increased imports resulting from higher growth levels. 
10 These studies, however, are silent regarding what factors generated investment. 
They assume, in fact, that higher investment was the result of higher levels of 
savings. For a contrasting view which emphasises the role of aggregate demand in 
the process of growth in some Asian economies see Halevi and Kriesler (1998, 
2007) and Kriesler and Halevi (1996). 
11 In words of Rostow (1956, p. 25): “The take-off is defined as the interval during 
which the rate of investment increases in such a way that real output per capita rises 
and this initial increase carries with it radical changes in production techniques and 
the disposition of income flows which perpetuate the new scale of investment and 
perpetuate thereby the rising trend in per capita output”. 
  2712 This is because in a context of low expansion or stagnated income consumers are 
not so risk avert to increase their consumption by incurring in debts, particularly 
through credit cards. 
13 The emphasis of the strategy of industrialisation might not necessarily be the 
industrial sector, it could be the service sector, or both. 
14 Recall that the logic of using the excess of international reserves for growth 
purposes might apply even for those economies that have rapidly recovered their 
growth rates after having undergone a crisis (namely Argentina, Turkey, Russia and 
some East Asian economies). This is because, as we stressed, crisis-affected 
economies do not recover output losses after they undergo a crisis. 
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(% of GDP) 
     1996  2005 
Latin America          
   Argentina  2.5  10.9 6.6  14.7 
   Brazil  2.2  1.8 7.5  6.8 
   Mexico  3.6  16.4 5.7  9.6 
East Asia         
   Indonesia  2.8  9.8 7.9  11.5 
   Korea  4.5  28.1 6.1  26.6 
   Malaysia  4.8  13.0 26.7  53 
   Philippines  4.2  13.3 12  16.2 
   Thailand  2.8  4.7 20.9  28.8 
   Japan  1.2  17.2 4.7  18.3 
Turkey  4.3  17.07 8.8  14 
Russia  4.0  40.6 2.8  23 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.9  17.8 6.2  13.1 






























  31Table 2. International reserves and its excess as a % of GDP in selected regions 
and countries, 1996-2005 
Region/Country  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  Averange 
Latin America               
   Argentina              
   International reserves     6.6  7.5  8.4  9.2  8.8  5.6  9.8  10.8  12.4  14.8  9.4 
      Excess  after  crisis          4.8  6.4  8.8  6.7 
   Brazil              
      International  reserves        7.5 6.3 5.5 6.5 5.3 7.1 8.2 9.7 8.8  6.8  7.2 
   Excess after crisis          -0.7  1.1  2.2  3.7  2.8  0.8  1.7 
   Mexico              
      International  reserves        5.7 7.2 7.6 6.7 6.2 7.2 7.9 9.2 9.4  9.6  7.7 
      Excess  after  crisis  -0.3 1.2 1.6 0.7 0.2 1.2 1.9 3.2 3.4  3.6  1.7 
E a s t   A s i a                 
   Indonesia              
   International reserves     7.9  7.9  24.2  18.6  17.6  16.5  15.5  14.8  13.8  11.5  14.8 
   Excess after crisis        12.6  11.6  10.5  9.5  8.8  7.8  5.5  9.5 
   Korea              
   International reserves     6.1  3.9  15.1  16.6  18.8  21.4  22.1  25.5  29.3  26.6  18.5 
   Excess after crisis        10.6  12.8  15.4  16.1  19.5  23.3  20.6  16.4 
   Malaysia              
   International reserves     26.7  21  36.1  39.2  31.1  34.1  34.7  42.3  55.9  53.8  36.5 
   Excess after crisis        33.2  25.1  28.1  28.7  36.3  49.9  47.8  35.6 
   Philippines              
      International  reserves      12  8.5 13.8 17.1 17.3 17.1 17.1 17.3 14.3  16.2  15.1 
   Excess after crisis        11.1  11.3  11.1  11.1  11.3  8.3  10.2  10.6 
   Thailand              
   International reserves     20.9  17.2  25.9  27.9  26  27.6  29.9  28.7  30.2  28.8  26.3 
   Excess after crisis        21.9  20  21.6  23.9  22.7  24.2  22.8  22.4 
   Japan              
   International reserves     4.7  5.2  5.6  6.6  7.6  9.7  11.8  15.7  18.2  18.4  10.4 
   Excess after crisis        0.6  1.6  3.7  5.8  9.7  12.2  12.4  6.6 
Turkey              
   International reserves     8.8  10.1  9.5  12.5  11.1  13.1  14.7  14.2  11.9  14.0  12.0 
   Excess after crisis              8.7  8.2  5.9  8.0  7.7 
Russia              
   International reserves     2.8  3.2  3  4.1  9.2  10.7  12.8  16.9  20.5  23  10.6 
   Excess after crisis        -1.9  3.2  4.7  6.8  10.9  14.5  17  7.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa              
   International reserves     6.2  8.2  8.2  8.8  10.2  10.4  10.3  9  11.5  13.2  9.6 
      Excess  after  crisis  0.2 2.2 2.2 2.8 4.2 4.4 4.3  3 5.5  7.2  3.6 
Source: WDI, CD-Rom, 2007. 
Note: the excess of international reserves is calculated assuming a maximum sustainable external 
threshold of 6 per cent. 
 
Table 3. Gross fixed capital formation in selected regions and countries, 1996-
2005 (% of GDP) 
Region/Country  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Latin America             
      Argentina  18.1 19.4 19.9 18.0 16.2 14.2 12.0 15.1 19.2 21.5 
   Brazil  19.1  19.5  19.6 19.1 21.8 20.6 19.0 16.4 18.2 18.3 
   Mexico  17.8  19.5  20.9 21.2 21.4 20.0 19.2 18.9 19.6 19.3 
E a s t   A s i a                 
      Indonesia  29.6 28.3 25.4 20.1 19.9 19.2 19.0 19.3 21.7 22.0 
   Korea  37.5  35.6  30.3 29.7 31.1 29.5 29.1 29.9 29.5 29.3 
   Malaysia  42.5  43.1  26.8  21.9 25.6 24.9 23.2 22.0 20.4 20.0 
      Philippines  23.4 24.4 21.1 19.1 21.2 17.9 17.6 16.8 16.1 14.9 
   Thailand  41.1  33.8  22.4  20.8  22.0 23.0 22.8 24.0 25.9 29.0 
   Japan  28.4  27.6  25.9 25.5 25.2 24.7 23.3 22.9 22.9 23.1 
Turkey  25.1 26.4 24.6 21.9 22.4 18.2 16.6 15.5 17.8 19.6 
Russia  20.0 18.3 16.2 14.4 16.9 18.9 17.9 18.4 18.3 18.2 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  16.9 17.1 18.5 17.7 16.9 17.5 17.7 17.9 18.2 18.7 
Source: WDI, CD-Rom, 2007 
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Table 4. Household consumption expenditure in selected regions and countries, 
1996-2005, (% of GDP) 
Region/Country  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Latin America               
      Argentina  70.1 70.8 70.1 70.0 70.7 70.3 60.9 62.7 62.6 61.1 
   Brazil  62.5  62.7  62.4 62.3 60.9 60.5 58.0 56.7 55.2 55.5 
   Mexico  65.1  64.2  67.4 67.0 67.0 69.6 69.0 68.7 68.1 68.3 
E a s t   A s i a                
      Indonesia  62.4 61.7 67.8 73.9 60.7 63.2 65.8 59.2 63.7 65.2 
   Korea  53.0  53.1  49.3 51.9 53.7 55.5 56.6 54.4 51.8 53.3 
   Malaysia  46.0  45.3  41.6  41.6 42.4 45.0 44.1 43.6 42.8 43.6 
      Philippines  72.8 72.4 73.0 68.0 63.8 71.9 71.3 78.0 77.0 79.8 
   Thailand  54.3  54.8  52.6  55.4  57.2 58.1 58.4 57.6 57.1 58.1 
   Japan  55.3  55.3  56.0 57.1 56.4 57.0 57.7 57.4 57.4 57.7 
Turkey  69.8 68.4 66.7 65.1 68.9 66.6 66.2 66.9 66.9 68.7 
Russia  52.6 54.7 59.6 53.5 46.2 48.9 51.4 50.3 50.4 49.1 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  67.6 69.0 69.8 69.2 65.6 65.5 66.1 63.9 64.8 65.0 
Source: WDI, CD-Rom, 2007 
 
Table 5. Government consumption expenditure in selected regions and countries, 
1996-2005, (% of GDP) 
Region/Country  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Latin America             
      Argentina  12.5 12.1 12.5 13.7 13.8 14.2 12.2 11.4 11.1 11.9 
   Brazil  18.5  18.2  19.1 19.1 19.1 19.2 20.1 19.9 18.8 19.5 
      Mexico  9.6  9.9 10.4 11.0 11.1 11.8 12.1 12.4 11.8 11.5 
E a s t   A s i a               
      Indonesia  7.6 6.8 5.7 6.6 6.5 6.7 7.1 8.0 8.4 8.2 
   Korea  11.6  11.6  12.8 12.3 12.1 12.9 12.9 13.3 13.5 14.1 
   Malaysia  11.1  10.8  9.8  11.0  10.4 12.6 13.8 13.9 13.2 12.9 
      Philippines  11.9 13.2 13.3 13.1 13.1 12.2 11.5 11.1 10.1  9.7 
   Thailand  10.2  10.1  11.1  11.5  11.3 11.3 11.1 10.7 11.1 11.8 
   Japan  15.4  15.4  16.0 16.6 16.9 17.5    17.7   17.9   17.8  17.6 
Turkey  11.6 12.3 12.7 15.2 14.1 14.2 14.0 13.6 13.2 13.1 
Russia  19.5 21.1 18.7 14.6 15.1 16.4 17.7 17.6 16.5 16.5 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  14.7 14.9 14.9 15.3 15.7 16.5 16.4 17.3 17.4 17.6 
Source: WDI, CD-Rom, 2007 
 
Table 6. Capital-output ratio, observed GDP growth and the upper bound rate of 
growth for some selected developing countries  






Upper bound rate 
of growth 
Argentina  2.8  9.0 11.4 
Brazil  1.4  2.6 3.8 
Mexico  1.7  3.6 4.5 
Indonesia  1.6  4.2 10.1 
Philippines  2.2  4.5 9.3 
Thailand  4  4.9 10.5 
Turkey  2.1  7.5 11.2 
Russia  1.4  6.7 12.3 
Notes: 
a for Argentina the average is for the period 2003-05, for Brazil 2000-05, for Mexico 
1996-2005, for East Asian countries 1999-2005, for Turkey 2002-05 and for Russia 1999-
2005 
Source: WDI, CD-Rom, 2007 